We study a problem in which a decision must be made on multiple social issues simultaneously. We define three new notions of fairness based on guarantees provided by naive roundrobin decision-making mechanisms -one that can only be achieved by exploiting randomized mechanisms, and two weaker notions that can be achieved by deterministic mechanisms. Finally, we examine whether the Nash Bargaining Solution satisfies our fairness notions.
Introduction
Consider a situation in which public funds are to be allocated to a community project: person A prefers that public funds be spent on a new sports field, and person B prefers the funds be spent on a public garden. When we have only a single project, it is clear that some tradeoff must be made (we either choose the garden, and A is unhappy, or we choose the sports field, and B is unhappy). However, if we have several issues that need to be decided, maybe we can reach a compromise by making sure that all agents are happy with at least some of the decisions. We are interested in formalizing a notion of fairness for this setting.
For the problem of allocating private goods among a set of agents, several criteria exist to measure the fairness of a solution. One of the most compelling notions is that of envy-freeness (Foley, 1967) , which states that no agent should envy the bundle of goods received by any other agent. However, when individual decisions involve public goods, the notion of envy is not so compelling. If the public funds end up being spent onthe garden, then it is not clear what it means for person A to envy person B. After all, both have access to the garden, so it is not as if A would have anything to gain by trading places with B.
A weaker notion than considered in the fair division literature is that of proportionality (Steinhaus, 1948) . Roughly speaking, proportionality states that each agent should receive value at least equal to a 1 n fraction of her total subjective value for all the goods combined. Our strongest axiom, which we call the Strong Round Robin Share (SRRS) axiom, reduces to proportionality when we restrict to private good settings. It requires that we guarantee each agent a 1 n fraction of the value she would receive if she got to choose her utility-maximizing outcome for all the issues (in the private good setting, each issue corresponds to the allocation of a single good). Unfortunately, proportionality (and therefore SRRS) cannot always be guaranteed if we insist on deterministic allocations (to see this, consider the case where a single indivisible item must be allocated among n > 2 agents). We therefore also consider two weakenings of SRRS: the round robin share axiom, which states that each agent should be entitled to choose the outcome of at least some 1 n fraction of the issues (without providing any guarantee on exactly which issues she gets to determine), and strong round robin share up to one issue, which states that the outcome should satisfy SRRS if we were able to give each agent control of a single additional issue. The latter can be seen as equivalent to proportionality up to one good when restricted to private good settings, and is similar in spirit to envy-freeness up to one good (Lipton et al., 2004) , which is a weakening of envy-freeness that can always be satisfied.
One common approach for obtaining an outcome that is, in a sense, both fair and efficient is the Nash bargaining solution, or Maximum Nash Welfare (MNW), (Nash, 1950) . This is the solution that maximizes the Nash social welfare -the product of the agents' utilities. In addition to the axiomatization in Nash's seminal paper (Nash, 1950) , the Nash bargaining solution has been shown to satisfy many nice properties in the context of fair division of indivisible private goods (Caragiannis et al., 2016) . It is thus a natural candidate to explore with regards to our round-robin share axioms because, while our weaker axioms can be (somewhat by definition) satisfied by roundrobin style mechanisms, such mechanisms are not always desirable. For one, there is an asymmetry between agents due to the need to define some order in which the agents choose outcomes, and such mechanisms are not generally Pareto efficient.
Preliminaries
Consider a set of n agents {1, . . . , n}. An issue t is defined by a set of alternatives A t = {a t 1 , . . . , a t kt }, exactly one of which must be chosen. Each agent i derives utility u t i (a t j ) ≥ 0 if alternative a t j is chosen. We assume that utilities are normalized so that for every round t and every agent i, there exists at least one alternative a t j with u t i (a t j ) = 0 (if necessary, we can always define a dummy alternative which each agent values at 0). 1 A multi-issue decision T = {A 1 , A 2 , . . . , A m } is a set of m issues. We will often refer to issue A t simply as t.
An outcome c t of an issue is a probability distribution over alternatives. A deterministic outcome is an outcome with only a single alternative in its support. A (deterministic) outcome c = (c 1 , . . . , c m ) of a multi-issue decision consists of a (deterministic) outcome for each of the m component issues. We note that in this paper we consider the offline problem where we are presented with the entire multi-issue decision problem upfront. It would be possible to consider an online version, where we must commit to the outcome of issue t before observing issue t + 1, but we do not do so here.
Let u t i (c) = u t i (c t ) denote the expected utility agent i derives from the outcome of issue t, and let u i = m t=1 u t i (c) denote the expected utility achieved by agent i from c. For a given issue t and agent i, let a t max (i) ∈ arg max a∈A t {u t i (a)}, and let u t max (i) = u t i (a t max (i)). That is, a t max (i) is an alternative that gives i the most utility for issue t, and u t max (i) is the utility that i derives from a t max (i) being chosen. For a multi-issue decision T , we define agent i's round robin share (RRS i ) to be the minimum utility that i can receive, subject to the condition that a t max (i) is chosen for at least p = m n issues. Intuitively, RRS i is the utility that i is guaranteed if agents take turns selfishly choosing the outcome of each issue. Formally, consider an ordering of T such that u 1
We say that an outcome satisfies the round robin share (RRS) axiom if u i ≥ RRS i for all i.
We define agent i's strong round robin share (SRRS i ) to be the expected utility achieved by agent i if she is allowed to choose the outcome of each issue with probability 1 n (and the outcome is chosen adversarially otherwise). That is,
We say that an outcome satisfies the strong round robin share (SRRS) axiom if u i ≥ SRRS i for all i.
Lastly, an outcome to a multi-issue decision provides strong round robin share up to one issue for agent i (SRRS1 i ), if there exists a single issue t such that if the outcome of t is changed from c t to a t max (i), while leaving the outcome of every other issue unchanged, then i achieves her strong round robin share. That is, an outcome satisfies SRRS1 i if there exists a t such that
We say that an outcome satisfies the strong round robin share up to one issue (SRRS1) axiom if it provides SRRS1 i for all i.
Example 1. Consider a multi-issue decision with two agents and two issues, defined by utility matrices
, giving utility u 1 = 2, u 2 = 0. c does not provide RRS. However, if we let c 1 = a 1 2 , agent 2 achieves utility 1 = SRRS 2 . Therefore, c does provide SRRS1.
Example 2. Consider a multi-issue decision with two agents and eight issues, defined by utility matrices
Note that RRS 1 = SRRS 1 = 4, RRS 2 = 0, and SRRS 2 = 2. Consider outcome c = (a 1 1 , a 2 1 , a 3 1 , a 4 1 , a 5 1 , a 6 1 , a 7 1 , a 8 1 ). Then u 2 = 0 and u 1 = 8, which is sufficient to provide RRS. However, c does not provide SRRS1 because switching the outcome of any single issue gives agent 2 at most utility 1 < SRRS 2 .
From Examples 1 and 2, we see that RRS and SRRS1 are incomparable. We also note that SRRS is a strictly stronger property than both RRS and SRRS1.
Existence and Complexity of Achieving Round Robin Share Axioms

SRRS RRS SRRS1 Deterministic outcomes
-(NP-c) (P) (P) General (randomized) outcomes (P) (P) (P) Table 1 provides an overview of the results in this section. A check mark or minus sign indicates whether an outcome satisfying the corresponding property is guaranteed to exist, and the complexity in parentheses indicates the complexity of finding such an outcome (or determining that one does not exist) for the positive cases (P), and the complexity of determining whether an outcome with the property exists in the negative cases (NP-c). (Of course, the latter problem is no harder than the former. Verifying whether a given outcome satisfies the property is always easy).
SRRS
If we allow general outcomes then we can satisfy SRRS by, for every issue t, choosing alternative a t j with probability 1 n |{i : a t max (i) = a t j |}. This is equivalent to choosing an agent uniformly at random for each issue and allowing her to choose the outcome, as in the definition of SRRS. Such an outcome is clearly computable in polynomial time. For deterministic outcomes, the property of SRRS is too strong, and, in a sense, no rule can guarantee any positive approximation.
Example 3. Consider a multi-issue decision with two agents and one issue.
The SRRS share of each agent is 0.5, which corresponds to a 1 2 probability of being allowed to dictate the outcome of the single issue. However, for deterministic outcomes it must be the case that one agent achieves zero utility, and therefore does not obtain any positive fraction of her SRRS share.
Given a multi-issue decision, how hard is it to decide whether or not there exists a deterministic outcome satisfying SRRS, and how hard is it to compute such an outcome, if one exists? We show that both of these questions are computationally hard.
Theorem 1. Given a multi-issue decision T , it is NP-complete to determine whether there exists a deterministic outcome satisfying SRRS.
Proof. Verifying that an outcome c satisfies SRRS is in P, since we can compute SRRS i and u i in polynomial time for each agent i, and check whether u i ≥ SRRS i . Hence the problem of determining existence is in NP. To show hardness, we reduce from the NP-complete PARTITION problem, which takes as input a set of integers S and asks whether it is possible to partition them into two sets S 1 and S 2 such that the sum of the integers in S 1 is equal to the sum of the integers in S 2 . For a fixed instance of PARTITION, define a multi-issue decision with two agents. For every s ∈ S, define an issue which corresponds to the allocation of a private good valued at s by both agents. Then an outcome satisfies SRRS if and only if it allocates all the items and gives each agent the same utility, which is exactly the condition required by the PARTITION problem. Thus, an outcome satisfying SRRS exists if an only if the PARTITION instance has a solution.
RRS
An RRS outcome always exists, even when restricted to deterministic outcomes. Such an outcome can be computed by running a simple round robin mechanism which we denote by RR. Under RR, we fix any ordering of the issues and the agents. For issues t = i, t = i + n, t = i + 2n, and so on, we choose c t = a t max (i). This guarantees that each agent has her utility maximized for at least p issues, satisfying RRS.
SRRS1
We can compute a deterministic outcome that satisfies SRRS1 in polynomial time via a more sophisticated round robin mechanism, which we will denote by RR * . The mechanism runs in m rounds as follows: Fix an ordering of the agents 1, . . . , n. For all rounds that are equal to i modulo n, the algorithm chooses both an issue t (that has not been chosen in an earlier round) and a (deterministic) outcome c t ∈ A t so that agent i's utility u t i (c t ) is maximized. That is, an agent whose turn it is may choose both an issue and an outcome for that issue.
Theorem 2. Mechanism RR * satisfies SRRS1.
Proof. Note that agent 1 achieves her SRRS share. To see this, consider an ordering of the issues 1, 2, . . . , m such that u 1 max (1) ≥ u 2 max (1) ≥ . . . ≥ u m max (1). For simplicity, assume that n divides m (the arguments easily extend to the general case). Under RR * , agent 1 achieves utility at least
where the inequality follows from the ordering of the issues. Consider a worst case in which an agent derives positive utility only from the issues for which they determine the outcome (outcomes for all other issues are chosen adversarially). Then it is true that if we hold an agent's positions in the choosing order constant, except move a single one of their appearances earlier in the order, then that agent's utility does not decrease. Therefore, consider some agent i > 1 and consider an ordering of the issues such that u 1 max (i) ≥ . . . ≥ u m max (i). Due to our worst case assumption, i achieves utility u i = u i max (i) + u i+n max (i) + . . . from RR * . To show that RR * satisfies SRRS1, consider setting c 1 = a 1 max (i). Now c t = a t max (i) for issues t = 1, i, i + n, i + 2n, . . ., which is strictly better for agent i than simply being selected as agent 1 in the RR * ordering of agents. Thus, after changing the outcome of a single issue, agent i achieves her SRRS share. Therefore RR * satisfies SRRS1.
A natural question is whether we can do better than SRRS1, in the sense that it could be possible to find a deterministic outcome so that for every agent there exists an issue such that giving that agent control of δ < 1 of a single issue suffices to get her SRRS share (this would be an SRRSδ solution, instead of SRRS1). The following example shows that such a strengthening is not possible if we allow a large number of issues.
Example 4. Let multi-issue decision T consist of the allocation of n − 1 private goods amongst n agents. Each agent values each good at 1. That is, each issue t ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1} has utility matrix
A t = a t 1 a t 2 · · · a t n 1 1 0 · · · 0 2 0 1 · · · 0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . n 0 0 · · · 1.
Therefore the SRRS share of each agent is
n−1 n . But one agent does not get allocated an item. This agent needs an additional n−1 n utility, which requires control of at least a n−1 n fraction of a single issue, to receive their SRRS share. For any δ < 1, there exists an n such that n−1 n > δ.
Nash Welfare and Round Robin Share Axioms
For deterministic outcomes, we have shown that one of our axioms is too strong, and the other two can always be achieved via natural round-robin mechanisms. However, round-robin mechanisms are undesirable because they are generally not Pareto-optimal, due to the fact that all agents receive their preferred alternative a comparable number of times. As a concrete example, suppose we are allocating several items among two agents. Each agent values each good at 1, with the exception of one item g which is valued at 1 + ǫ by agent 1 and 100 by agent 2. If agent 1 chooses first, she chooses item g, after which the agents arbitrarily choose half of the remaining items each. There exists a mutually beneficial swap where agent 1 gives agent 2 item g in exchange for two other items. This increases agent 2's utility by 98, and increases agent 1's utility by 1 − ǫ. Further, round-robin mechanisms are not symmetric in that agents who choose early in the order receive an advantage over agents that choose later in the order.
In this section we consider the Nash bargaining solution -that is, the solution that optimizes the product i u i . When we allow general outcomes, this can be computed efficiently, but when restricted to deterministic outcomes it is NP-hard to compute (Nguyen et al., 2014; Uckelman and Endriss, 2010) .
SRRS RRS SRRS1
Deterministic outcomes
Private utilities -General utilities --General (randomized) outcomes Private utilities General utilities Table 2 : Maximum Nash Welfare and round robin share axioms Table 2 summarizes the results in this section.
General Utilities
When restricted to deterministic outcomes (we will address general outcomes later), Nash Welfare fails RRS. RRS requires that u 1 ≥ 1.01, however Nash welfare chooses a 1 2 and a 2 2 , resulting in u 1 = 1, u 2 = 3.
Example 5. Consider a multi-issue decision with two agents and two issues.
However, MNW does satisfy SRRS1 even when restricted to deterministic outcomes.
Theorem 3. For deterministic outcomes, MNW satisfies SRRS1.
Proof. Suppose that SRRS1 is not satisfied for agent i. Since the MNW outcome and the SRRS1 property are unchanged by constant scaling of any agent's utilities, we may assume that u i ′ = 1 for all i ′ = i and that SRRS i = 1. Let t be an issue for which the ratio
is maximized. We will show that if we set c t = a t max (i), the Nash Welfare increases. Note that
That is, the change in outcome for issue t increases the utility of agent i by at least as much as the sum of the utility of all other players decreases. So let us consider the lowest possible Nash Welfare that could result from setting c t = a t max (i). For a fixed decrease in i ′ =i u i ′ , the Nash Welfare decreases the most when the entire loss is attributed to a single agent h. Suppose that this agent loses x utility, for new utility 1 − x. Agent i has gained at least x utility, resulting in u i + x < 1 utility, where the inequality follows from the fact that the original outcome failed SRRS1 for agent i. So, the Nash Welfare maximizing outcome has Nash Welfare
while the new outcome has Nash Welfare at least
contradicting maximality of the Nash bargaining outcome.
As a corollary of Theorem 3, we have that MNW satisfies SRRS (and therefore RRS and SRRS1) when we allow randomized outcomes. To see this, consider copying each issue K times. As K becomes large, the relative effect of granting a single agent control of a single issue becomes negligible. Thus, as K approaches infinity, the utility of each agent in the Nash bargaining solution approaches their SRRS share. The number of copies of each issue with c t = a t j is proportional to the weight placed on a t j in the randomized outcome.
Corollary 4. Nash Welfare satisfies SRRS when randomized outcomes are allowed.
Private Good Utilities
In this section we consider the special case where each alternative gives positive utility to at most one agent. That is, each issue can be seen as allocating a single item to a single agent for private use. Since this is a special case of general utilities, the results of Theorem 3 and Corollary 4 for the case of general utilities still apply. Indeed, it is a known fact that when divisible allocations are allowed, the Nash bargaining solution coincides with the competitive equilibrium from equal incomes (CEEI) solution (Vazirani, 2007) , which provides proportionality (and therefore SRRS). However, for this special case, Nash Welfare also satisfies RRS for deterministic outcomes.
Theorem 5. Nash Welfare satisfies RRS for private good utilities, even when outcomes are required to be deterministic.
Proof. Suppose for contradiction that agent i is not guaranteed her RRS share. Then it must be the case that i receives fewer than p items (if i receives p items, then i necessarily receives their RRS share). Therefore, there exists an agent h that receives more than p items. Let S i and S h be the sets of items received by agents i and h respectively. So |S i | < p and |S h | > p. Let |S h | = p + c, for some c > 0. We assume without loss of generality that c = 1, and will show that in this case it would be possible to increase the Nash Welfare by transferring one of the items allocated to h to i instead. This is without loss of generality because we can imagine discarding some of h's items, so that she is left with only p+1 items. This can only decrease the utility u h . So, if we can still increase the Nash Welfare by making a transfer from h to i even after throwing away some of h's items, then the same transfer certainly increases the Nash Welfare when h has her true, higher, utility. For this proof, we introduce a new piece of notation. We associate each issue t directly with a single item to be allocated, and denote by u i,t the utility that i receives if she is allocated item t. For a Nash Welfare maximizing allocation, it must be the case that for all t ∈ S h ,
otherwise the Nash Welfare could be (weakly) increased by giving item t to agent i instead of agent h. Further, we know that
We will show that the existence of an example where this holds results in a contradiction. Suppose, without loss of generality, that RRS i = 1 (since we can always scale the utilities of agent i appropriately). Thus, for any subset of items T ′ , |T ′ | ≥ p, it holds that
Fix x = t∈S h u i,t . Having fixed this sum, we will now choose the values of u i,t maximize the expression
subject to the constraints imposed by Equation (2), and show that the maximal value is at most p, thus arriving at the necessary contradiction. The contradiction follows from the fact that u i < RRS i = 1, which gives us
Assume that the elements of S h are ordered so that u i,1 ≥ u i,2 ≥ . . . ≥ u i,p+1 . Then the optimal distribution of weight, subject to the constraints from Equation (2), is to set u i,1 = . . . = u i,q = x − 1, u i,q+1 = y, and u i,q+2 = . . . = u i,p+c = 0, where x = q(x − 1) + y, with q ≥ 2 and y < x − 1. To see this, note that if u i,t > x − 1 for any t, the sum of the remaining p values of u i,t is strictly less than 1 = RRS i , which contradicts that the sum of i's utilities for any p items is at least RRS i . If any u i,t < 0, this violates the assumption that all agents have non-negative utility for all items. Thus, we have upper and lower bounds on the possible values of each u i,t . To see that the stated values are optimal, suppose that they are take some other values. In particular, this would mean that there exist u i,t and u i,t ′ with 0 < u i,t ≤ u i,t ′ < x − 1 (since, if only one u i,t has 0 < u i,t < x − 1, the values for {u i,t |t ∈ S h } can only be as specified above). Then it is possible to shift some ǫ > 0 from u i,t to u i,t ′ without changing the value of any other variable or violating the constraints (2). We show that this would increase the objective (3). The objective increases if and only if 1 1 + u i,t + 1 1 + u i,t ′ < 1 1 + u i,t − ǫ + 1 1 + u i,t ′ + ǫ ⇐⇒ u i,t + u i,t ′ + 2 (1 + u i,t )(1 + u i,t ′ ) < u i,t + u i,t ′ + 2 (1 + u i,t − ǫ)(1 + u i,t ′ + ǫ) ⇐⇒ (1 + u i,t )(1 + u i,t ′ ) > (1 + u i,t − ǫ)(1 + u i,t ′ + ǫ) ⇐⇒ (1 + u i,t )(1 + u i,t ′ ) > (1 + u i,t )(1 + u i,t ′ ) + ǫ(1 + u i,t ) − ǫ(1 + u i,t ′ ) − ǫ 2 ⇐⇒ ǫ(1 + u i,t ′ ) + ǫ 2 > ǫ(1 + u i,t ), which is always true, by the assumption that u i,t ≤ u i,t ′ and ǫ > 0. Since wwe assumed it was possible to satisfy Equation (1), it must hold for our specific choice of {u i,t |t ∈ S h }. That is, Issue 1 can be seen to consist of allocating two private goods: agent 1 values good g 1 at 0.01 and good g 2 at 1, while agent 2 values good g 1 at 1 and good g 2 at 0. The four ways in which the goods can be allocated correspond exactly to issue A 1 . Note that issue 2 corresponds to a single private good allocation problem.
